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CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 
 
This case calls upon us to determine whether venue for 
Andrew Auernheimer’s prosecution for conspiracy to violate 
the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”), 18 U.S.C. § 
1030, and identity fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(7) was 
proper in the District of New Jersey.  Venue in criminal cases 
is more than a technicality; it involves “matters that touch 
closely the fair administration of criminal justice and public 
confidence in it.”  United States v. Johnson, 323 U.S. 273, 
276 (1944).  This is especially true of computer crimes in the 
era of mass interconnectivity.  Because we conclude that 
venue did not lie in New Jersey, we will reverse the District 
Court’s venue determination and vacate Auernheimer’s 
conviction. 
I. 
 
A. 
 
 The relevant facts are fairly simple and not in dispute.  
Apple, Inc. introduced the first iPad, a tablet computer, in 
2010.  Customers who purchased the version that had the 
capability to send and receive data over cellular networks 
(commonly referred to as “3G”) had to purchase a data 
contract from AT&T, Inc. (“AT&T”), which at the time was 
the exclusive provider of data services for this version of the 
iPad.  Customers registered their accounts with AT&T over 
the Internet on a website that AT&T controlled.  In the 
registration process, customers were assigned a user identifier 
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(“user ID”) and created a password — login credentials that 
they would need in order to access their accounts through 
AT&T’s website in the future.  The user ID assigned to each 
customer was that customer’s email address. 
 
 AT&T decided to make it easier for customers to log 
into their accounts by prepopulating the user ID field on the 
login screen with their email addresses.  To do this, AT&T 
programmed its servers to search for an iPad user’s Integrated 
Circuit Card Identifier (“ICC-ID”) when a user directed her 
browser to AT&T’s general login webpage (AT&T’s 
“URL”1).  An ICC-ID is the unique nineteen- or twenty-digit 
number that identifies an iPad’s Subscriber Identity Module, 
commonly known as a SIM Card.  The SIM Card is the 
computer chip that allows iPads to connect to cellular data 
networks. 
 
 If AT&T’s servers recognized the ICC-ID as 
associated with a customer who had registered her account 
with AT&T, then AT&T’s servers would automatically 
redirect the customer’s browser away from the general login 
URL to a different, specific URL.  That new specific URL 
was unique for every customer and contained the customer’s 
ICC-ID in the URL itself.  Redirecting the customer’s 
browser to the new specific URL told AT&T’s servers which 
email address to populate in the user ID field on the login 
page.  This shortcut reduced the amount of time it took a 
customer to log into her account because, with her user ID 
already populated, she had to enter only her password.
2
 
                                              
1
 URL is shorthand for uniform resource locator, which is 
defined as “a specific address . . . used by a browser in 
locating the relevant document [on the Internet].”  URL, 
Oxford Eng. Dictionary, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry  
/258858?redirectedFrom=URL#eid (last visited Mar. 27, 
2014).  It is more commonly known as a “web address.”  
Appendix (“App.”) 255. 
2
 To make this more concrete, when an iPad user wanted to 
log into her account, she would direct her browser to 
“https://dcp2.att.com/OEPNDClient/”.  If AT&T’s server 
recognized the ICC-ID of the iPad that made the request as an 
iPad that was already registered with AT&T, its servers 
would automatically redirect the user to 
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 Daniel Spitler, Auernheimer’s co-conspirator, 
discovered this feature of AT&T’s login process.  Although 
he did not own an iPad, he purchased an iPad SIM Card, 
hoping to install it on another computing device and then take 
advantage of the unlimited cellular data plan that AT&T 
offered for $30 per month.  At first, he did not know how to 
register his SIM Card, so he downloaded the iPad operating 
system onto his computer, decrypted it, and browsed through 
the operating system’s code to try to find a way to register it.  
In the course of doing so, he came across AT&T’s 
registration URL.  He noticed that one of the variables in the 
registration URL was a field requiring an ICC-ID. 
 
 Spitler then directed his computer’s web browser to 
the registration URL and inserted his iPad’s ICC-ID in the 
requisite place.  AT&T’s servers were programmed only to 
permit browsers that self-identified as iPad browsers to access 
the registration URL.  This required him to change his 
browser’s user agent.  A user agent tells a website what kind 
of browser and operating system a user is running, so servers 
that someone is attempting to access can format their 
responses appropriately.  App. 256.  
 
After changing his browser’s user agent to appear as 
an iPad, Spitler was able to access the AT&T login page.  He 
noticed that his email address was already populated in the 
login field and surmised that AT&T’s servers had tied his 
email address to his ICC-ID.  He tested this theory by 
changing the ICC-ID in the URL by one digit and discovered 
that doing so returned a different email address.  He changed 
the ICC-ID in the URL manually a few more times, and each 
time the server returned other email addresses in the login 
field. 
 
Spitler concluded that this was potentially a 
noteworthy security flaw.  He began to write a program that 
he called an “account slurper” that would automate this 
process.  The account slurper would repeatedly access the 
                                                                                                     
“https://dcp2.att.com/OEPNDClient/openPage?ICCID=XXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX&IMEI=0”, where the string of 
“X”s is the nineteen- or twenty-digit ICC-ID. 
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AT&T website, each time changing the ICC-ID in the URL 
by one digit.  If an email address appeared in the login box, 
the program would save that email address to a file under 
Spitler’s control. 
 
Spitler shared this discovery with Auernheimer, whom 
he knew through Internet-based chat rooms but had never met 
in person.   Auernheimer helped him to refine his account 
slurper program, and the program ultimately collected 
114,000 email addresses between June 5 and June 8, 2010.  
Its method — guessing at random — is called a “brute force” 
attack, a term of art in the computer industry referring to an 
inefficient method of simply checking all possible numbers.   
 
While Spitler’s program was still collecting email 
addresses, Auernheimer emailed various members of the 
media in order to publicize the pair’s exploits.  Some of those 
media members emailed AT&T, which immediately fixed the 
breach.  One of the media members contacted by 
Auernheimer was Ryan Tate, a reporter at Gawker, a news 
website.  Tate expressed interest in publishing Auernheimer’s 
story.  To lend credibility to it, Auernheimer shared the list of 
email addresses with him.  Tate published a story on June 9, 
2010 describing AT&T’s security flaw, entitled “Apple’s 
Worst Security Breach:  114,000 iPad Owners Exposed.”  
The article mentioned some of the names of those whose 
email addresses were obtained, but published only redacted 
images of a few email addresses and ICC-IDs. 
Evidence at trial showed that at all times relevant to 
this case, Spitler was in San Francisco, California and 
Auernheimer was in Fayetteville, Arkansas.  The servers that 
they accessed were physically located in Dallas, Texas and 
Atlanta, Georgia.  Although no evidence was presented 
regarding the location of the Gawker reporter, it is undisputed 
that he was not in New Jersey. 
 
B. 
 
Despite the absence of any apparent connection to 
New Jersey, a grand jury sitting in Newark returned a two-
count superseding indictment charging Auernheimer with 
conspiracy to violate the CFAA, 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C) 
and (c)(2)(B)(ii), in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (count one), 
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and fraud in connection with personal information in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(7) (count two, commonly 
referred to as “identity fraud”).  To enhance the potential 
punishment from a misdemeanor to a felony, the Government 
alleged that Auernheimer’s CFAA violation occurred in 
furtherance of a violation of New Jersey’s computer crime 
statute, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:20-31(a).  See 18 U.S.C. § 
1030(c)(2)(B)(ii). 
 
  Auernheimer moved to dismiss the superseding 
indictment shortly after it was returned by the grand jury.  In 
addition to asserting several challenges concerning the CFAA 
violation, he argued that venue was not proper in the District 
of New Jersey.  The District Court acknowledged that neither 
he nor Spitler was ever in New Jersey while allegedly 
committing the crime, and that the servers accessed were not 
in New Jersey, but denied his motion nonetheless.  It held that 
venue was proper for the CFAA conspiracy charge because 
Auernheimer’s disclosure of the email addresses of about 
4,500 New Jersey residents affected them in New Jersey and 
violated New Jersey law.  It further held that because venue 
was proper for the CFAA count, it was also proper for the 
identity fraud count because proving the CFAA violation was 
a necessary predicate to proving the identity fraud violation. 
 
 Auernheimer’s trial lasted five days and resulted in a 
guilty verdict on both counts.  Initially, both parties requested 
a jury instruction on venue.  App. 575.  Venue is a question 
for the jury and the court “must specifically instruct the jury 
on venue” if “(1) the defendant objects to venue prior to or at 
the close of the prosecution’s case-in-chief, (2) there is a 
genuine issue of material fact with regard to proper venue, 
and (3) the defendant timely requests a jury instruction.”  
United States v. Perez, 280 F.3d 318, 334 (3d Cir. 2002).  
Although Auernheimer objected to venue and requested an 
instruction, the District Court held that there was no genuine 
issue of material fact.  It concluded that the Government had 
established that venue was proper in New Jersey as a matter 
of law and declined to instruct the jury on venue.  App. 591. 
 
 After denying Auernheimer’s post-trial motions, the 
District Court sentenced him to forty-one months of 
imprisonment.  Auernheimer timely appealed. 
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II. 
 
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. § 3231.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1291.  Our review of the District Court’s legal decision 
regarding venue is plenary.  United States v. Pendleton, 658 
F.3d 299, 302 (3d Cir. 2011).   
 
III. 
 
Although this appeal raises a number of complex and 
novel issues that are of great public importance in our 
increasingly interconnected age, we find it necessary to reach 
only one that has been fundamental since our country’s 
founding:  venue.  The proper place of colonial trials was so 
important to the founding generation that it was listed as a 
grievance in the Declaration of Independence.  See The 
Declaration of Independence para. 21 (U.S. 1776) (objecting 
to “transporting us beyond seas to be tried for pretended 
offences”).  It was of such concern that the Constitution of the 
United States “twice safeguards the defendant’s venue right.”  
United States v. Cabrales, 524 U.S. 1, 6 (1998).  Article III 
requires that “the Trial of all Crimes . . . shall be held in the 
State where the said Crimes shall have been committed.”  
U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 3.  The Sixth Amendment further 
provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial 
jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have 
been committed.”  Id. amend VI.  This guarantee is codified 
in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which require 
that “the [G]overnment must prosecute an offense in a district 
where the offense was committed.”  Fed. R. Crim. P. 18. 
 
Congress may prescribe specific venue requirements 
for particular crimes.  Pendleton, 658 F.3d at 303.  Where it 
has not, as is the case here, we must determine the crime’s 
locus delicti.  Id.; see also Black’s Law Dictionary 1025 (9th 
ed. 2009) (defining locus delicti as the “place where an 
offense was committed”).  “[T]he locus delicti must be 
determined from the nature of the crime alleged and the 
location of the act or acts constituting it.”  United States v. 
Anderson, 328 U.S. 699, 703 (1946); accord United States v. 
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Rodriguez-Moreno, 526 U.S. 275, 279 (1999); Cabrales, 524 
U.S. at 6-7.  To perform this inquiry, we “must [1] initially 
identify the conduct constituting the offense . . . and then [2] 
discern the location of the commission of the criminal acts.”  
Rodriguez-Moreno, 526 U.S. at 279.  Venue should be 
narrowly construed.  Johnson, 323 U.S. at 276. 
 
Continuing offenses, such as conspiracy, that are 
“begun in one district and completed in another, or committed 
in more than one district, may be inquired of and prosecuted 
in any district in which such offense was begun, continued, or 
completed.”  18 U.S.C. § 3237(a).  In the context of a 
conspiracy charge, “venue can be established wherever a co-
conspirator has committed an act in furtherance of the 
conspiracy.”  Perez, 280 F.3d at 329; accord Hyde v. United 
States, 225 U.S. 347, 356-67 (1912).  The Government must 
prove venue by a preponderance of the evidence.  United 
States v. Root, 585 F.3d 145, 155 (3d Cir. 2009). 
 
In performing our venue inquiry, we must be careful to 
separate “essential conduct elements” from “circumstance 
element[s].”  Rodriguez-Moreno, 526 U.S. at 280 & n.4.  For 
example, in Cabrales the Supreme Court considered whether 
venue for money laundering activities was proper in Missouri.  
524 U.S. at 4.  The laundered proceeds were generated by 
illegal narcotics sales in Missouri, but all acts constituting the 
money laundering offense took place in Florida.  Id.  The 
Court held that venue was improper in Missouri.  Id. at 10.  
The Supreme Court, later reflecting on Cabrales, observed 
that the “existence of criminally generated proceeds” was 
only a “circumstance element” of money laundering.  
Rodriguez-Moreno, 526 U.S. at 280 n.4.  Although it was an 
element of the crime that the Government had to prove to the 
jury, it was a “circumstance element” because it was simply a 
fact that existed at the time that the defendant performed her 
laundering acts.  Only “essential conduct elements” can 
provide the basis for venue; “circumstance elements” cannot.  
United States v. Bowens, 224 F.3d 302, 310 (4th Cir. 2000). 
 
A. 
 
 Count one charged Auernheimer with conspiracy to 
violate CFAA § 1030(a)(2)(C) and (c)(2)(B)(ii).  In the 
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indictment and at trial, the Government identified the nature 
of the conduct constituting the offense as the agreement to 
commit a violation of the CFAA in furtherance of a violation 
of New Jersey’s computer crime statute, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 
2C:20-31(a).  Venue would be proper in any district where 
the CFAA violation occurred, or wherever any of the acts in 
furtherance of the conspiracy took place.  See Perez, 280 F.3d 
at 329; see also Rodriguez-Moreno, 526 U.S. at 281-82 
(citing Hyde, 225 U.S. at 356-67). 
 
 The charged portion of the CFAA provides that 
“[w]hoever . . . intentionally accesses a computer without 
authorization or exceeds authorized access, and thereby 
obtains . . . information from any protected computer . . . shall 
be punished as provided in subsection (c) of this section.”  18 
U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C).  To be found guilty, the Government 
must prove that the defendant (1) intentionally (2) accessed 
without authorization (or exceeded authorized access to) a (3) 
protected computer and (4) thereby obtained information.  
See United States v. Willis, 476 F.3d 1121, 1125 (10th Cir. 
2007) (delineating the elements in a similar manner).  The 
statute’s plain language reveals two essential conduct 
elements:  accessing without authorization and obtaining 
information.
3
 
 New Jersey was not the site of either essential conduct 
element.  The evidence at trial demonstrated that the accessed 
AT&T servers were located in Dallas, Texas, and Atlanta, 
Georgia.  App. 443-44.  In addition, during the time that the 
conspiracy began, continued, and ended, Spitler was 
obtaining information in San Francisco, California (App. 
233), and Auernheimer was assisting him from Fayetteville, 
Arkansas (App. 366).  No protected computer was accessed 
and no data was obtained in New Jersey.   
                                              
3
 The Department of Justice’s own manual on prosecuting 
computer crimes provides in its section devoted to venue that 
“it would seem logical that a crime under section 
1030(a)(2)(C) is committed where the offender initiates 
access and where the information is obtained.”  Computer 
Crime & Intellectual Prop. Section, Dep’t of Justice, 
Prosecuting Computer Crimes 118, available at 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/cybercrime/docs/ccmanual.p
df (last visited Mar. 26, 2014) (“DOJ Manual”). 
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 This is not the end of our analysis, however, because 
the Government did not just charge Auernheimer with 
conspiracy to commit an ordinary violation of the CFAA, but 
also with conspiring to violate the CFAA in furtherance of a 
state crime.  The Government can increase the statutory 
maximum punishment for a subsection (a)(2) violation from 
one year to five years if it proves one of the enhancements 
contained in § 1030(c)(2)(B).  The enhancement relevant here 
provides for such increased punishment if “the offense was 
committed in furtherance of any criminal or tortious act in 
violation of the . . . laws of . . . any State.”  Id. § 
1030(c)(2)(B)(ii).  “[A]ny ‘facts that increase the prescribed 
range of penalties to which the criminal defendant is exposed’ 
are elements of the crime” that must be proven to the jury 
beyond a reasonable doubt.
4
  Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. 
Ct. 2151, 2160 (2013) (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 
U.S. 466, 490 (2000)).  This is true even if they are explicitly 
termed “sentence enhancement[s]” in the statute.  Apprendi, 
530 U.S. at 494 n.19 (quotation marks omitted).   
 The New Jersey statute allows for criminal liability “if 
the person purposely or knowingly and without authorization, 
or in excess of authorization, accesses any . . . computer [or] 
computer system and knowingly or recklessly discloses, or 
causes to be disclosed any data . . . or personal identifying 
information.”  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:20-31(a).  Its essential 
conduct elements are accessing without authorization (or in 
excess of authorization) and disclosing data or personal 
identifying information.   
 
 Here, none of the essential conduct elements of a 
violation of the New Jersey statute occurred in New Jersey.  
As discussed, neither Auernheimer nor Spitler accessed a 
                                              
4
 Just because the enhancement is an “element” that the 
Government needed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt does 
not mean that it was an “essential conduct element” of a § 
1030(a)(2)(C) violation within the meaning of Rodriguez-
Moreno that could establish venue.  For the purposes of this 
opinion, however, we will assume (without deciding) that the 
enhancement could contain “essential conduct elements.” 
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computer in New Jersey.
5
  The disclosure did not occur there 
either.  The sole disclosure of the data obtained was to the 
Gawker reporter.  There was no allegation or evidence that 
the Gawker reporter was in New Jersey.  Further, there was 
no evidence that any email addresses of any New Jersey 
residents were ever disclosed publicly in the Gawker article.  
The alleged violation of the New Jersey statute thus cannot 
confer venue for count one. 
 
 Just as none of the conduct constituting the CFAA 
violation or its enhancement occurred in New Jersey, none of 
the overt acts that the Government alleged in the superseding 
indictment occurred in New Jersey either.  The indictment 
listed four overt acts:  writing the account slurper program, 
deploying the account slurper program against AT&T’s 
servers, emailing victims to inform them of the breach, and 
disclosing the emails addresses obtained to Gawker.  The co-
conspirators collaborated on the account slurper program 
from California and Arkansas and deployed it against servers 
located in Texas and Georgia.  The Government offered no 
evidence whatsoever that any of the victims that Auernheimer 
emailed were located in New Jersey, or that the Gawker 
reporter to whom the list of email addresses was disclosed 
was in the Garden State.   
 
 Because neither Auernheimer nor his co-conspirator 
Spitler performed any “essential conduct element” of the 
underlying CFAA violation or any overt act in furtherance of 
the conspiracy in New Jersey, venue was improper on count 
one.  
                                              
5
 We also note that in order to be guilty of accessing “without 
authorization, or in excess of authorization” under New 
Jersey law, the Government needed to prove that 
Auernheimer or Spitler circumvented a code- or password-
based barrier to access.  See State v. Riley, 988 A.2d 1252, 
1267 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2009).  Although we need not 
resolve whether Auernheimer’s conduct involved such a 
breach, no evidence was advanced at trial that the account 
slurper ever breached any password gate or other code-based 
barrier.  The account slurper simply accessed the publicly 
facing portion of the login screen and scraped information 
that AT&T unintentionally published. 
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B. 
 
 We now turn to count two of the indictment because 
venue must be analyzed independently for each count.  See 
Root, 585 F.3d at 155.  Count two charged Auernheimer with 
violating 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(7), which punishes anyone who 
“knowingly transfers, possesses, or uses, without lawful 
authority, a means of identification of another person with the 
intent to commit, or to aid or abet, or in connection with, any 
[federal crime, or state or local felony].”  The statute’s plain 
language indicates that the statute punishes someone who (1) 
knowingly (2) transfers, possesses, or uses without lawful 
authority (3) a means of identification of another person (4) 
with the intent to commit, or in connection with, any violation 
of federal law or any state felony.  See United States v. 
Abdelshafi, 592 F.3d 602, 607 (4th Cir. 2010) (delineating the 
elements of a violation of aggravated identity fraud in 18 
U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1), which are virtually identical, in a 
similar fashion); United States v. Stephens, 571 F.3d 401, 
404-05 (5th Cir. 2009) (same). 
 
 The two essential conduct elements under § 1028(a)(7) 
are transfer, possession, or use, and doing so in connection 
with a federal crime or state felony.  Cf. Rodriguez-Moreno, 
526 U.S. at 280 (noting that “during and in relation to any 
crime of violence” was an essential conduct element of a 
firearms statute).  Starting with the latter essential conduct 
element, the Government charged Auernheimer with 
committing identity fraud “in connection with” the ordinary 
violation of CFAA § 1030(a)(2)(C).  As should be clear by 
now, no conduct related to the ordinary CFAA violation 
occurred in New Jersey. 
 
 There was also no evidence that Auernheimer’s 
transfer, possession, or use occurred in New Jersey.  The 
Government advances two theories of how he could have 
satisfied this essential conduct element.  First, it contends that 
he violated § 1028(a)(7) by knowingly using the ICC-IDs of 
other people’s iPads to access AT&T’s servers.  See Gov’t 
Br. 64-66.  Venue fails under this theory because there was no 
allegation or evidence that he used the ICC-IDs in New 
Jersey.  The alleged conspirators used the ICC-IDs in their 
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account slurper program, which was programmed from 
California and Arkansas, and did not access any computer or 
obtain any information in New Jersey.   
 
 The Government also argues that Auernheimer 
violated the statute by transferring the list of email addresses 
that he obtained to Gawker with the intent to violate the New 
Jersey computer crime statute.  See Gov’t Br. 67-69.  But 
there was no allegation in the indictment or evidence at trial 
that the Gawker reporter to whom he transferred the email 
addresses was in New Jersey — and no essential conduct 
element of the alleged violation of New Jersey law occurred 
in New Jersey either.
6
   
 
 Because Auernheimer did not commit any essential 
conduct of the identity fraud charge in New Jersey, venue was 
also improper on count two. 
IV. 
 
 The Government does not dispute the locations of 
Auernheimer, Spitler, and AT&T’s servers during the period 
of time that Auernheimer was committing the alleged crimes.  
Instead, it advances a series of other reasons why there was 
no defect in venue that warrants vacating his conviction.  
None of them are availing. 
 
A. 
 
 The Government argues that we need not rely on the 
essential conduct elements test mandated by Cabrales and 
Rodriguez-Moreno because we have “adopted,” Gov’t Br. 71, 
                                              
6
 Further, count two of the indictment charged Auernheimer 
with transferring, possessing, and using the means of 
identification of others in connection with only an ordinary 
violation of CFAA § 1030(a)(2)(C).  It did not mention the 
violation of New Jersey law or the § 1030(c)(2)(B)(ii) 
enhancement at all.  This second theory thus “broaden[s] the 
possible bases for conviction from that which appeared in the 
indictment.”  United States v. McKee, 506 F.3d 225, 229 (3d 
Cir. 2007) (quotation marks omitted).  It cannot be a 
permissible basis upon which to find venue for count two. 
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a “substantial contacts test.”  Under this approach, frequently 
employed by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, a 
number of factors help to determine whether venue was 
proper, including “the site of the defendant’s acts, the 
elements and nature of the crime, the locus of the effect of the 
criminal conduct, and the suitability of each district for 
accurate factfinding.”  United States v. Reed, 773 F.2d 477, 
481 (2d Cir. 1985).  The Government contends that venue is 
proper in New Jersey because about four percent 
(approximately 4,500 of 114,000) of the email addresses 
obtained from AT&T’s website belonged to New Jersey 
residents, thereby satisfying the “locus of the effect[s]” 
consideration.  See id. 
 
 It is far from clear that this Court has ever “adopted” 
this test.  We have mentioned it only once.  See United States 
v. Goldberg, 830 F.2d 459, 466 (3d Cir. 1987).  The test was 
cited in a long block quote to Reed, and then analyzed in a 
single sentence.  Id.  The Goldberg panel did not need to rely 
on the locus of the effects of the defendant’s conduct in that 
case because all of his acts took place in the district in which 
he was tried.  Id.  No panel of this Court has ever cited 
Goldberg, or any other case, for this test since — either 
before, or especially after, the Supreme Court clarified the 
venue inquiry in Cabrales and Rodriguez-Moreno.   
 
 Even if it could be said that we perhaps tacitly 
endorsed this test once almost thirty years ago, the test 
operates to limit venue, not to expand it.  Cases from the 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit make this clear.  The 
test “does not represent a formal constitutional test,” but 
rather is merely “helpful in determining whether a chosen 
venue is unfair or prejudicial to a defendant.”  United States 
v. Saavedra, 223 F.3d 85, 93 (2d Cir. 2000).  To satisfy this 
test, there must be “more than ‘some activity in the situs 
district’; instead, there must be ‘substantial contacts.’”  
United States v. Davis, 689 F.3d 179, 186 (2d Cir. 2012) 
(quoting Reed, 773 F.2d at 481).  There “must be some sense 
of venue having been freely chosen by the defendant.”  Id. 
(alteration and quotation marks omitted).  If a defendant 
argues that the chosen venue is constitutionally infirm but that 
it did not result in any hardship to him, the court only 
determines the locus delicti and does not then analyze 
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whether there were “substantial contacts.”  See United States 
v. Magassouba, 619 F.3d 202, 205 n.2 (2d Cir. 2010).  This 
test thus serves to limit venue in instances where the locus 
delicti constitutionally allows for a given venue, but trying 
the case there is somehow prejudicial or unfair to the 
defendant. 
 
 Even assuming that the substantial contacts test is 
viable within our Circuit, it cannot serve as a sufficient basis 
for conferring venue.  The Government argues only that it has 
minimally satisfied one of the four prongs of the test — the 
“locus of the effect of the criminal conduct.”  There was no 
evidence at trial that Auernheimer’s actions evinced any 
contact with New Jersey, much less contact that was 
“substantial.”  The Government has not cited, and we have 
not found, any case where the locus of the effects, standing by 
itself, was sufficient to confer constitutionally sound venue. 
 
 Undoubtedly there are some instances where the 
location in which a crime’s effects are felt is relevant to 
determining whether venue is proper.  See Rodriguez-
Moreno, 526 U.S. at 279 n.2 (reserving the issue of whether 
venue may also be permissibly based on the location where a 
crime’s effects are felt).  But those cases are reserved for 
situations in which “an essential conduct element is itself 
defined in terms of its effects.”  Bowens, 224 F.3d at 311.  
For example, in a prosecution for Hobbs Act robbery, venue 
may be proper in any district where commerce is affected 
because the terms of the act themselves forbid affecting 
commerce.  See 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a); accord United States v. 
Smith, 198 F.3d 377, 383 (2d Cir. 1999).  This is consistent 
with Congress’s prerogative to “provide that the locality of a 
crime shall extend over the whole area through which force 
propelled by an offender operates.”  Johnson, 323 U.S. at 275. 
 
  Sections of the CFAA other than § 1030(a)(2)(C) do 
speak in terms of their effects.  For example, § 1030(a)(5)(B) 
criminalizes intentionally accessing a computer without 
authorization and recklessly causing damage.  Because that 
 17 
 
crime is defined in terms of its effects — the damage caused 
— venue could be proper wherever that occurred.7 
 
 Congress, however, did not define a violation of § 
1030(a)(2)(C) in terms of its effects.  The statute simply 
criminalizes accessing a computer without authorization and 
obtaining information.  It punishes only the actions that the 
defendant takes to access and obtain.  It does not speak in 
terms of the effects on those whose information is obtained.  
The crime is complete even if the offender never looks at the 
information and immediately destroys it, or the victim has no 
idea that information was ever taken. 
 
B. 
 
 The Government also argues that venue was proper in 
New Jersey because Auernheimer failed to obtain 
authorization from approximately 4,500 New Jersey residents 
to “use[] their ICC-ID numbers to access the AT&T servers.”  
Gov’t Br. 80.  The Government argues that when a statute 
makes it a crime to fail to do some required act, venue can lie 
in the district in which the act should have been done.  The 
Government concludes that venue is proper because 
Auernheimer and Spitler failed to obtain authorization from 
about 4,500 people in New Jersey prior to accessing AT&T’s 
servers. 
 
 This rule only applies, however, when a preexisting 
legal duty requires the act that the defendant failed to do.  See 
1 Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 6.2(a) (2d 
ed. 2003) (noting that crimes of omission are generally 
limited by specific duties such as relationship, statute, 
contract, assumption of care, creation of peril, controlling the 
conduct of others, and landowner); accord United States v. 
Sabhnani, 599 F.3d 215, 237 (2d Cir. 2010).  Failure to 
                                              
7
 The Department of Justice manual again tailors its guidance 
to this assessment, noting that a prosecution under § 
1030(a)(5) “may be brought where the effects are felt because 
those charges are defined in terms of ‘loss,’ even if the bulk 
of network crimes may not be prosecuted in a district simply 
because the effects of the crime are felt there.”  DOJ Manual 
at 120. 
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perform a required act could confer venue where a defendant 
should have performed that act when a statute penalizes 
inaction, such as failure to report to a military draft board 
(see, e.g., Johnston v. United States, 351 U.S. 215, 219-20 
(1956)), failure to report to prison after being sentenced (see, 
e.g., United States v. Overaker, 766 F.2d 1326, 1327 (9th Cir. 
1985)), or failure to file income tax returns (see, e.g., United 
States v. Garman, 748 F.2d 218, 219 (4th Cir. 1984)).  Here, 
Auernheimer was under no such preexisting duty — legal or 
otherwise.  Like most statutes, the charged portion of the 
CFAA punishes affirmative acts, not inaction.  His failure to 
obtain authorization cannot confer venue in every district in 
which a potential victim lived. 
 
C. 
 
 Finally, the Government argues that even if venue 
were improper, we should apply harmless error analysis and 
disregard the error because it did “not affect substantial 
rights.”  Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a).  Although the Government 
makes this argument only in passing — it occupies less than 
one page of its 118-page brief — we feel obliged to address 
it.  The Government contends that its choice of forum actually 
benefitted Auernheimer, because locating his trial in Newark, 
New Jersey “enhance[d] his ability to attract and retain 
experienced and capable counsel on a pro bono basis.”  Gov’t 
Br. 98; see also id. at 97 (noting that Newark was a 
“relatively easy commute” for Auernheimer’s attorney from 
his office in Brooklyn, New York). 
 
 At the outset, we are skeptical that venue errors are 
susceptible to harmless error analysis.  The Supreme Court 
has divided constitutional errors into two classes:  “trial” and 
“structural.”  Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 307-10 
(1991).  Trial errors occur “during the presentation of the case 
to the jury” and can be “quantitatively assessed in the context 
of other evidence presented” in order to determine whether 
they are “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Id. at 307-
08.  These include “most constitutional errors.”  Id. at 306.  
Structural errors “defy” harmless error analysis because they 
“affect[] the framework within which the trial proceeds,” id. 
at 309-10, “or indeed [] whether it proceeds at all,” United 
States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 150 (2006).  These 
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include a “limited class of fundamental constitutional errors,” 
Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 7 (1999), such as the 
denial of the rights to counsel, self-representation, or a public 
trial.  See Gonzales-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 149 (listing examples 
and authority). 
 
 An error regarding venue exhibits many of the 
characteristics of structural error.   If the District Court had 
found venue lacking upon Auernheimer’s motion to dismiss, 
there would have been no trial in New Jersey at all.  Even if 
venue had been raised only at trial, “if venue is improper no 
constitutionally valid verdict could be reached regardless of 
the [potentially] overwhelming evidence against the 
defendant.”  United States v. Miller, 111 F.3d 747, 757 (10th 
Cir. 1997) (Barrett, J., dissenting).  The error thus “def[ies] 
analysis by harmless-error standards by affecting the entire 
adjudicatory framework.”  Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 
129, 141 (2009) (quotation marks omitted).  Holding that 
defective venue could ever be harmless would arguably 
reduce this constitutional protection to a nullity because, 
under the Government’s formulation, the error would be 
harmless as long as the evidence against the accused of the 
substantive crime was overwhelming.  It is doubtful that this 
is the way the venue protections in the Constitution were 
meant to operate.  See also 4 Wayne R. LaFave et al., 
Criminal Procedure § 16.1(g) (4th ed. 2007) (“Failure of 
venue will not be treated as harmless error.”).   
 
The Supreme Court has never held that improper 
venue is subject to harmless error review.  The Government 
has pointed to only one case where a court subjected 
defective venue to harmless error review.  See United States 
v. Hart-Williams, 967 F. Supp. 73, 78-81 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).  
In Hart-Williams, the district court found the venue error 
harmless after the defendant was convicted at a courthouse in 
Brooklyn, New York, that was less than a mile from the 
courthouse where venue would have been proper in 
Manhattan, New York.  See id. at 80.  No court has cited 
Hart-Williams for this proposition, and the Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit has cast doubt on whether the district 
court’s application of harmless error review remains good 
law.  See United States v. Brennan, 183 F.3d 139, 149 (2d 
Cir. 1999) (holding that trial in Brooklyn, New York, where 
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venue was improper, was not harmless when the defendant 
timely objected to venue, even though venue would have 
been proper in Manhattan, New York); see also Saavedra, 223 
F.3d at 100 n.5 (Cabranes, J., dissenting) (explicitly noting 
that Brennan forecloses applying harmless error analysis to 
defective venue). 
 
 Nonetheless, even assuming that defective venue could 
be amenable to harmless error review, the venue error here 
clearly affected Auernheimer’s substantial rights.  In order for 
an error to be harmless, “the Government must ‘prove beyond 
a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not 
contribute to the verdict obtained.’”  Gov’t of V.I. v. Davis, 
561 F.3d 159, 165 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Chapman v. 
California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)).  The question “is not 
whether, in a trial that occurred without the error, a guilty 
verdict would surely have been rendered, but whether the 
guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely 
unattributable to the error.”  Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 
275, 279 (1993).  The venue error in this case is not harmless 
because there was no evidence that any of the essential 
conduct elements occurred in New Jersey.  If Auernheimer’s 
jury had been properly instructed on venue, it could not have 
returned a guilty verdict; the verdict rendered in this trial 
would have been different.  See United States v. Durades, 607 
F.2d 818, 820 (9th Cir. 1979) (failing to try defendant in 
district where crime was allegedly committed infringed the 
defendant’s substantial rights); see also United States v. 
Glenn, 828 F.2d 855, 860 (1st Cir. 1987) (same); United 
States v. Stratton, 649 F.2d 1066, 1076 n.15 (5th Cir. 1981) 
(“A defendant’s interest in being tried only in a district where 
venue properly lay clearly constitutes a substantial right.” 
(quotation marks omitted)). 
 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly made clear that the 
constitutional limitations on venue are extraordinarily 
important.  “[Q]uestions of venue are more than matters of 
mere procedure.  They raise deep issues of public policy in 
the light of which legislation must be construed.”  Travis v. 
United States, 364 U.S. 631, 634 (1961) (quotation marks 
omitted).  “The provision for trial in the vicinity of the crime 
is a safeguard against the unfairness and hardship involved 
when an accused is prosecuted in a remote place.”  United 
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States v. Cores, 356 U.S. 405, 407 (1958); accord United 
States v. Passodelis, 615 F.2d 975, 977 (3d Cir. 1980).  The 
founders were so concerned with the location of a criminal 
trial that they placed the venue requirement, which is 
“principally a protection for the defendant,” Cabrales, 524 
U.S. at 9, in the Constitution in two places.  See U.S. Const. 
art. III, § 2, cl. 3 and amend. VI. 
 
 They did so for good reason.  A defendant who has 
been convicted “in a distant, remote, or unfriendly forum 
solely at the prosecutor’s whim,” United States v. Salinas, 
373 F.3d 161, 164 (1st Cir. 2004), has had his substantial 
rights compromised.  Auernheimer was hauled over a 
thousand miles from Fayetteville, Arkansas to New Jersey.  
Certainly if he had directed his criminal activity toward New 
Jersey to the extent that either he or his co-conspirator 
committed an act in furtherance of their conspiracy there, or 
performed one of the essential conduct elements of the 
charged offenses there, he would have no grounds to 
complain about his uprooting.  But that was not what was 
alleged or what happened.  While we are not prepared today 
to hold that an error of venue never could be harmless,
8
 we do 
not need to because the improper venue here — far from 
where he performed any of his allegedly criminal acts — 
                                              
8
 We note that we are not dealing with a situation where the 
error complained of is that the trial judge failed to instruct the 
jury on venue.  That claim may be reviewed for harmless 
error.  See United States v. Casch, 448 F.3d 1115, 1117-18 
(9th Cir. 2006) (noting that when proof of venue is clear, 
failure to instruct the jury can be considered harmless error); 
United States v. Martinez, 901 F.2d 374, 377 (4th Cir. 1990) 
(same); United States v. Moeckly, 769 F.2d 453, 461 (8th Cir. 
1985) (same).  In that situation, the failure to instruct would 
be harmless if the Government demonstrates under the 
Chapman standard that sufficient evidence of venue existed 
such that the jury would have come to that conclusion too.  
Cf. Neder, 527 U.S. at 7-11 (holding that an erroneous jury 
instruction that omitted an element of the offense is subject to 
harmless error analysis).  The question that we address today 
is whether a venue defect could be harmless when there is no 
possibility that the jury could have found venue proper. 
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denied Auernheimer’s substantial right to be tried in the place 
where his alleged crime was committed.
9
   
 
V. 
 
Venue issues are animated in part by the “danger of 
allowing the [G]overnment to choose its forum free from any 
external constraints.”  Salinas, 373 F.3d at 169-70 (citing 
Travis, 364 U.S. at 634).  The ever-increasing ubiquity of the 
Internet only amplifies this concern.  As we progress 
technologically, we must remain mindful that cybercrimes do 
not happen in some metaphysical location that justifies 
disregarding constitutional limits on venue.  People and 
computers still exist in identifiable places in the physical 
world.  When people commit crimes, we have the ability and 
obligation to ensure that they do not stand to account for 
those crimes in forums in which they performed no “essential 
conduct element” of the crimes charged.  Rodriguez-Moreno, 
526 U.S. at 280.   
 
“Though our nation has changed in ways which it is 
difficult to imagine that the Framers of the Constitution could 
have foreseen, the rights of criminal defendants which they 
sought to protect in the venue provisions of the Constitution 
are neither outdated nor outmoded.”  Passodelis, 615 F.2d at 
977.  Just as this was true when we decided Passodelis in 
1980 — after the advent of railroad, express mail, the 
telegraph, the telephone, the automobile, air travel, and 
satellite communications — it remains true in today’s Internet 
age.  For the forgoing reasons, we will reverse the District 
Court’s venue determination and vacate Auernheimer’s 
conviction. 
 
                                              
9
 We in no way imply that venue cannot be waived by the 
defendant by failing to object to it in a timely fashion.  See 
Perez, 280 F.3d at 328.  Because Auernheimer explicitly 
moved to dismiss the indictment for lack of venue, there is no 
contention that he waived his venue right here. 
